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deterioration in the risk composition of borrowers versus an increase in borrowers’ willingness to default due
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important time-varying default factor, consistent with a decline in default costs.
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Debt issued by consumers is an under-studied asset class. There has been particularly 
little academic study of recent trends in default on this debt. Between 1994 and 1997 the number 
of personal bankruptcy filings in the U.S. rose by about 75%. The 1.35 million filings in 1997 
represented well over 1% of U.S. households. Delinquency rates on credit cards rose almost as 
sharply. [Federal Reserve Board of Cleveland (1998)]  The resulting losses to lenders amounted 
to a sizeable fraction of the interest payments they collect, potentially raising the average cost of 
credit. These trends in default, both in bankruptcy and delinquency, are especially surprising in 
light of the strong economy over the period. They provide an unusually rich source of variation to 
test the stability of models that forecast personal default and of credit risk models more generally. 
There are two leading explanations for these trends. First, the risk-composition of 
borrowers might have worsened. Under the “risk effect,” less credit-worthy borrowers obtained 
additional credit in recent years, and it is these borrowers who accounted for most of the rise in 
default. In particular, many analysts cite growth in the number of credit card offers and in the 
sizes of credit card limits, among other changes in the supply of consumer credit, as the most 
important factors behind the rise in default. (See e.g. the New York Times (1998).)  
The second explanation focuses on the costs of default, including social, information, and 
legal costs. Default is often associated with social stigma, both non-pecuniary (e.g., disgrace) and 
pecuniary (e.g., the consequences of a bad reputation). Many analysts argue that these social 
costs have recently declined, as default has become more commonplace. Filing for bankruptcy 
also entails information and legal costs which might also have declined. Here analysts cite 
growth in the number of bankruptcy lawyers and their advertising (as prohibitions on advertising 
were loosened), as well as in other sources of advice like “how-to-file” books. Further, the flow 
of informal advice from family and friends might have accelerated as more people have been 
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through bankruptcy.1,2 Even a small decline in these various costs could substantially increase 
default rates, considering White (1997)’s estimate that between 15% and 31% of U.S. households 
could benefit, just in terms of their current net worth, by filing for bankruptcy. Generalizing these 
arguments, by the “demand effect” we mean that people have become more willing to default 
over time, after controlling for their risk characteristics (which take into account the effects of 
changes in credit supply) and other standard economic fundamentals. 
It is important to determine the relative significance of these two alternative explanations. 
Unlike the risk effect the demand effect represents a change in the relationship between default 
and the variables that lenders typically use to predict default, such as debt levels. Credit risk 
models would be missing some systematic and time-varying factor, and hence be unstable, 
potentially resulting in the misallocation or mispricing of credit. Unlike a deliberate expansion in 
the supply of credit, an unexpected decline in the costs of default would lead to greater credit 
losses than expected.3  While lenders can respond to increased losses from either the risk or 
demand effects by improving the risk-composition of their portfolios, a significant decline in 
default costs might require more substantial changes in lending standards. As regards public 
policy, some analysts subscribing to the risk effect have advocated restricting credit supply in 
order to improve the risk-composition of the borrowing population. Others, subscribing to the 
                                                           
1
 Weller (1998) provides a typical exposition of these arguments: “Just as attorney advertising has enhanced the 
public’s awareness of bankruptcy as a financial escape hatch and bankruptcy reform has made filing less time 
consuming than renewing a driver’s license, the stigma of bankruptcy has become a shadow of its former self. The 
names of good bankruptcy attorneys and stories about the ease of getting out of debt are passed around the water 
cooler like football scores on a Monday morning in October.” 
2
 Another potential cost of default is reduced access to future credit and transactions services. Increases in post-
default credit, or increased information about such credit, is consistent with the demand effect. However, while there 
appears to have been an increase in subprime lending and secured credit cards (which are often provided post-
default) in the early 1990s, we are unaware of evidence that this form of credit substantially increased during our 
sample period. In fact, some analysts suggest that it might have declined in the later part of the period in response to 
increased losses in the earlier part. For an analysis of post-default access to credit, see Musto (2000). 
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demand effect, have advocated making the terms of bankruptcy less attractive in order to increase 
the perceived costs of default.  
Unfortunately, it has been difficult to disentangle the risk and demand effects empirically. 
First, it is not obvious how to operationalize the demand effect. The various costs of default, 
especially social, legal, and information costs, are inherently difficult to measure. Most of the 
proxies that have been suggested run into problems of endogeneity and reverse causality.4 A 
second difficulty is that controlling for risk-composition requires detailed measures of credit 
supply and credit risk for a large sample of borrowers, including a large number of borrowers 
who have defaulted. As in the literature on corporate default, traditional household data sets do 
not provide enough information. 
This paper uses a new data set containing a panel of thousands of individual credit card 
accounts from several different card issuers. The data is of very high quality. It includes 
essentially everything that the issuers know about their accounts, including information from 
peoples’ credit applications, monthly statements, and credit bureau reports. In particular, the data 
set records cardholder default (both delinquency and bankruptcy) and contains a rich set of 
measures of credit risk including debt levels, purchase and payment histories, credit lines, and 
credit risk scores, the issuers’ own overall summary statistics for the risk of each account.  
We use this data to analyze credit card delinquency and more broadly personal 
bankruptcy and the stability of credit risk models. Aggregate credit card debt currently amounts 
to over $500 billion, much of which is securitized, so credit card default is of interest in itself. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3
 Many analysts appear to have been surprised by the rise in default rates and credit loses over the 1994-1997 period 
[Moody’s (1997)]. 
4
 For example, consider using the number of advertisements by bankruptcy lawyers as an inverse proxy for 
information and legal costs. The problem is that an increase in ads might not be the cause of the rise in bankruptcies, 
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Further, because about 75% of U.S. households hold credit cards, and our data set includes credit 
bureau variables pertaining to all sources of consumer credit, not just credit cards, we are able to 
study personal bankruptcy and default in general. Total consumer debt amounts to about $6T, 
$1.3T excluding mortgages [Federal Reserve System (1999)]. Compared to the assets side of 
household balance sheets, there has been surprisingly little analysis to date of the liabilities side, 
largely for lack of data. Finally, empirical models of personal default and corporate default are in 
many ways analogous. On the corporate side, Saunders (1999) emphasizes the same two 
difficulties discussed above: the paucity of data, especially the limited number of observations of 
default; and the potential instability of default models over time, especially over the business 
cycle. In contrast, our data allows us to study a large number of defaulters over a concentrated 
sample period, 1995-1997, of benign macro-economic conditions. Finding model instability in 
such a sample would be a relatively strong result.  
Specifically, we estimate duration models for default, for both credit card delinquency 
and personal bankruptcy, and assess the relative importance of different variables in predicting 
default. For instance, are younger accounts and accounts with larger credit lines more likely to 
default? The estimated models also allow us to evaluate the quality of commercial credit scores 
as predictors of bankruptcy and delinquency. Are the scores efficient predictors of default, 
incorporating all information available to issuers? Moreover, we investigate how the propensity 
to default has changed over time, disentangling the risk and demand effects. Since the data 
include the information that the card issuers themselves use to measure risk, we are able to 
control for all changes in the risk-composition of accounts that were observable by the issuers. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
but rather their effect. The increased bankruptcies could be due to the risk effect, with lawyers responding to the 
increased demand for their services with additional advertising. 
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This allows us to assess the stability of default models from the point of view of a lender trying 
to forecast default in his portfolio.  
A key finding is that the relation between default and economic fundamentals appears to 
have substantially changed over the sample period. Even after controlling for risk-composition 
and other standard economic variables, the propensity to default significantly increased between 
1995 and 1997. Ceteris paribus, a credit card holder in 1997 was almost 1 percentage point more 
likely to declare bankruptcy and 3 percentage points more likely to go delinquent than a 
cardholder with identical risk characteristics in 1995. These magnitudes are almost as large as if 
the entire population of cardholders had become one standard deviation riskier, as measured by 
credit risk scores. By contrast, increases in credit limits and other changes in risk-composition 
explain only a small part of the change in default rates over time. Standard default models appear 
to have missed an important, systematic and time-varying default factor, consistent with the 
demand effect. 
Section 1 of the paper describes the data used in the analysis and Section 2 discusses 
related studies. Section 3 develops the econometric methodology and Section 4 reports the 
results. Conclusions appear in Section 5.  
 
1. Data Description 
 
The authors have assembled a panel data set of credit card accounts from several different 
credit card issuers. The accounts are representative of all open accounts in 1995. Because the 
issuers include some of the largest credit card companies in the U.S., the data should be generally 
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representative of credit card accounts in the U.S. in 1995.5 The individual accounts are then 
followed monthly for two years or more, depending on the issuer. Different credit card issuers 
track somewhat different sets of variables at different frequencies depending on whether the 
variables come from cardholders’ monthly statements, credit bureau reports, or credit 
applications. To protect the identity of the accounts and the issuers, the data from different 
issuers were pooled together, with great care taken to define variables consistently across issuers. 
The reported results will focus on variables common to all the issuers. However, the results were 
checked for robustness separately for each issuer, using that issuer’s complete set of variables. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the main variables used below. 
This data has a number of unique advantages compared to traditional household data sets 
like the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) or the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). 
First, the large cross-section of accounts contains thousands of observations of even low 
probability events like delinquency and bankruptcy. Second, the long time series makes it 
possible to estimate explicitly dynamic models of default. Third, in contrast to data based on 
surveys of households, measurement error is much less of a problem. Fourth, the data contains 
essentially all the variables used by issuers in evaluating accounts. Using account data does, 
however, entail a number of limitations. The main unit of analysis in the data is a credit card 
account, not an individual or a household. We partially circumvent this limitation by using data 
from the credit bureaus, which cover all sources of credit used by the account holder, and by 
examining account delinquency in addition to bankruptcy. Also, there is little information about 
some potentially important variables like household assets or employment status. However the 
                                                           
5
 As a check, the data were benchmarked against the more limited and self-reported credit card information in the 
1995 Survey of Consumer Finances and the aggregate data on revolving consumer credit collected by the Federal 
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issuers also lack access to this information, so its absence will not affect our identification 
strategy. Also, the study by Fay, Hurst, and White (1998) discussed below finds that the effects 
of such variables on bankruptcy are relatively small in magnitude. 
 
2. Related Studies 
 
Most empirical studies of default have focused on bankruptcy, concentrating on the effect 
of changes in the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 or on the effects of different exemption levels on 
filing rates across U.S. states. (For a review see Hynes (1998).) These studies have generally used 
aggregated data, and hence do not address the role of risk-composition.  
In their historical discussion of bankruptcy, Moss and Johnson (1998) note that lower 
income households have gained increased access to credit over time. They argue that this 
“democratization” of credit can potentially explain the recent rise in bankruptcy. This argument 
is a version of the risk-composition effect. (See also Ausubel (1997).) Unfortunately the SCF, 
which Moss and Johnson use to document the change in the distribution of debt, does not record 
whether people have filed for bankruptcy so they are unable to test their argument empirically. 
Also, the amount of debt households carry is an endogenous variable, conflating credit demand 
and supply, and so cannot itself be said to “explain” default.6 Finally, since there have been 
changes in the income distribution of credit in the past, it does not follow that recent changes in 
credit supply explain current bankruptcy trends. The relative importance of risk-composition 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Reserve. It appears that the SCF households underreport their credit card borrowing, perhaps to avoid perceived 
stigma. (See Gross and Souleles (2001).) 
6
 In a companion paper, Gross and Souleles (2001), we explicitly distinguish credit demand and supply, identifying 
the response of credit card debt to changes in supply. 
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versus other factors like default costs is a quantitative question that can only be answered with 
suitable data. 
Domowitz and Sartain (1999) circumvent the limitations of the SCF by combining it with 
a separate data set of bankruptcy petitions. They use this additional data essentially to estimate 
whether the various households in the 1983 SCF have filed for bankruptcy, as a function of their 
demographic characteristics. However, it can be difficult to estimate low-probability events like 
bankruptcy in a small, cross-sectional sample like the SCF.7  
The 1996 PSID contained a set of retrospective questions about bankruptcy. Fay, Hurst, 
and White (1998) use this data to identify the effects of social stigma. Because the PSID also 
recorded data on household balance sheets in a number of years (1984, 1989, and 1994), the 
authors are able to estimate for each household in their sample the economic benefit of filing for 
Chapter 7, taken to be the value of debt that would be discharged minus assets (net of exemption 
levels) that would be relinquished. As an inverse proxy for stigma or information costs, the 
authors use the lagged bankruptcy rate in the state in which the household resides. They find that 
the probability of filing increases with both the economic benefit of filing and the inverse proxy 
for stigma. However, the magnitude of the increase is small in both cases. This paper differs from 
the Fay, Hurst, and White study in a number of ways. First, their PSID sample contains only 
about 250 observations of bankruptcy over the course of a twelve-year period ending in 1995. 
Non-linear inference on such a small sample of households can be difficult.8 Second, the PSID 
                                                           
7
 To illustrate, the SCF sub-sample used in their analysis contains about 1,900 households. Even at today’s 
bankruptcy rate of approximately 1%, which is much larger than the 1983 rate, the sub-sample would include only 
about 19 households that actually filed for bankruptcy. 
8
 Fay, Hurst, and White estimate that their PSID households underreported the incidence of bankruptcy by about 
50% relative to aggregate statistics. 
 9
does not contain explicit measures of household credit risk like risk scores, nor measures of 
credit supply like credit lines. Third, we estimate explicitly dynamic duration models for default. 
Ausubel (1999) uses data from a credit card issuer to analyze interesting marketing 
experiments that varied the terms of credit card offers. He finds evidence of adverse selection in 
the pools of applicants responding to different offers, in both their observed characteristics and 
their subsequent default risk. However, he does not address the questions of interest here, such as 
the relative importance of the risk and demand effects, in part because his data includes only a 
single “cohort” of accounts.9  
The related literature on corporate default is much larger, though as already noted it too 
has been constrained by data limitations. Also, as Shumway (1998) emphasizes, much of the 
literature has used static, cross-sectional specifications for default. By contrast the duration 
analysis used here will explicitly accommodate changes over time in the riskiness of a given 
borrower.  
 
3. Econometric Methodology 
 
From the data set described in Section 1, we drew a representative sample of all credit 
card accounts open as of June 1995, excluding only accounts that had been closed or frozen on or 
before June 1995 because they were already bankrupt or three or more cycles delinquent.10,11 
                                                           
9
 Hence the specified models of default are static and cannot analyze the risk-composition of different cohorts of 
credit card accounts. Also, they cannot distinguish the time and seasoning (age of account) effects that will play 
important roles below, because time and seasoning are perfectly collinear for a single cohort. 
10
 This makes the data stationary. The accounts already two cycles delinquent in June 1995 can go three cycles 
delinquent immediately in the following month. While accounts that are one or zero cycles delinquent in June 1995 
must wait at least one or two months respectively before going three cycles delinquent, this is true in subsequent 
months as well. Account holders can go bankrupt in any month. We also re-ran the main specifications dropping the 
first and the first two quarters of data. The results were consistent with the results reported in the text. 
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These accounts are followed for the next 24 months, or until they first default or attrite in good 
standing.12 This period from 1995:Q3 through 1997:Q2 covers the time of the sharp rise in 
default at the national level. Two indicator variables were created that identify the first month in 
the sample, if any, in which an account defaulted. The delinquency indicator, DEL, identifies the 
first time that an account failed to meet its minimum payment for three successive months, the 
standard industry definition of serious delinquency. The bankruptcy indicator, BK, identifies the 
month in which the card issuer was notified or learned from the credit bureaus that the cardholder 
filed for bankruptcy. Accounts that are both delinquent and bankrupt are counted as bankrupt.13 
This yields about four thousand accounts going bankrupt and fourteen thousand accounts going 
delinquent. A random sample of about ten thousand accounts that never default within the 
sample period is included as a control group. The delinquent and the bankrupt accounts are each 
separately compared to the non-default control group. The resulting samples overweight 
defaulting accounts, in predetermined proportions, in order to increase precision. All the results 
below are weighted to make them representative.  
We estimate dynamic probit models for default that are equivalent to discrete duration 
models [Shumway (1998), Hoynes (1999)]. For either the delinquency or bankruptcy sample, let 
Di,t indicate whether account i defaulted in month t. For instance an account that goes three 
cycles delinquent in month 10 would have Dit=0 for the first nine months, Di,10=1, and then drop 
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 To simplify the analysis of the age of a credit card account below, the main analysis excludes accounts opened 
before 1990. Given the recent growth in the number of accounts, this restriction retains most accounts. The 
conclusions below are unaffected whether or not these older accounts are included. 
12
 About one fifth of the accounts attrite in good standing before the end of the sample period. Their characteristics 
are similar to those of the accounts that last until the end of the sample; for example, their credit scores are only a 
few points lower. The duration models we estimate allow for such attrition. As a check, we re-ran the main 
specifications dropping these attritors from the entire sample, and verified that our conclusions did not change. 
13
 Of the bankrupt accounts, about one fifth never went delinquent, half went delinquent before bankrupt, and the 
rest went delinquent and bankrupt together. When bankruptcy followed delinquency it usually followed within a 
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out of the sample. Let *
,tiD  be the corresponding latent index value. The main specification that 
will be estimated is given by Eq. (1): 
 titiD ,
*
,
η+′+′+′+′= ti,3ti,2ti,1t0 econbriskbagebtimeb .  (1) 
agei,t represents the number of months that account i has been open by time t. This variable 
allows for “seasoning” of credit card accounts. For instance, accounts might become less likely to 
default as they age. Under the duration model interpretation of Eq. (1), it is agei,t that allows the 
hazard rate for default to vary with duration (duration-dependence). The vector agei,t represents a 
fifth-order polynomial in account age, to allow the associated hazard function to vary non-
parametrically. riski,t and econi,t represent account-specific measures of risk and local economic 
conditions, respectively, and will be further described below. The time dummies timet, 
corresponding to calendar quarters, allow for shifts over time in the average propensity to default, 
for accounts of any age and risk characteristics and controlling for economic conditions. They 
capture any other time-varying default factors. 
It will be helpful to begin with a simpler specification. A probit model of delinquency 
was first estimated with only the time dummies and the fifth-order polynomial in account age as 
the independent variables, omitting riski,t and econi,t. Figure 1 displays the resulting predicted 
values. Each curve shows the effect of account age (seasoning) on the probability of delinquency, 
i.e. the non-parametric hazard function, for a different quarter. The underlying age variables are 
both statistically and economically significant. The inverted-U shape suggests that the probability 
of delinquency rises from the time an account is booked until about its two-year birthday, and 
then declines. The coefficients on the time dummies are also significant and generally increasing 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
quarter, so grouping them together should not affect the results. The estimated hazard functions for bankruptcy and 
delinquency (below) have similar shapes, but different levels since delinquency is more common. 
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over time, though not completely monotonic. This suggests that the hazard functions shifted over 
time, and so the simple specification is unstable. 
It is tempting to interpret these shifts as reflecting the demand effect, due to changes in 
people’s willingness to default. However, the shifts could instead reflect changes over time in the 
risk-composition of accounts, due to changes in credit supply, or in other economic 
fundamentals. For instance if lending standards were loosened over time, recently booked 
accounts might be riskier, raising the average default rate. To illustrate, we re-estimated the 
simple probit model replacing the time dummies with “cohort” or vintage dummies reflecting the 
time at which each account was opened. For instance the 1990 cohort is composed of the 
accounts that were opened in 1990. Figure 2 shows the predicted values, with each curve now 
representing the age hazard-function for a given cohort, over the period in which that cohort 
appears in the sample.14 The effect of age is similar to that in Figure 1, with the hazard rate 
peaking at about two years. But for a given age, the younger cohorts (to the left in the figure) are 
more likely to go delinquent than the older cohorts (at the bottom right).  
At first glance these results seem to support the risk effect, since recent cohorts of 
accounts appear to be riskier.15 However, the results do not rule out the possibility that all 
cohorts, not just the recent cohorts, became increasingly likely to default in recent years. In fact, 
Figures 1 and 2 are statistically equivalent because of the “life cycle” identity that links the 
month in which an account is opened (represented by its cohort), the age of the account, and the 
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 The cohort dummies are for 1990, 1991, 1992, the first and second halves of 1993 and 1994, and the first half of 
1995. The curve furthest to the “south-east” represents the 1990 cohort, which was already over 50 months old at the 
beginning of the sample in 1995 and is then followed for the 24 months of the sample period. The curve furthest to 
the “west” represents accounts opened in the first part of 1995, which are only a few months old at the start of the 
sample and are also followed for the 24 months of the sample period. 
15
 Also, the younger cohorts start the sample with lower credit scores on average than the older cohorts. However 
this difference largely reflects the seasoning effects prominent in the figures. 
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current month. Since the opening date plus age equals time, the two specifications underlying the 
figures are collinear.16  
 Eq. (1) avoids this identification problem by replacing the cohort dummies with account-
specific measures of risk, riski,t, which are not collinear with age and time. These measures 
provide a more complete specification of risk at the individual account level, while still capturing 
differences in average risk characteristics at the cohort level. The reason that different cohorts 
have different average probabilities of default is that there are different fractions of risky 
accounts in each cohort, so what matters is the riskiness of the individual accounts. The available 
risk measures are quite comprehensive. They include direct, monthly observations of the 
performance of each account, such as debt levels, purchase and payment histories, and credit 
lines, as well as the credit risk scores, the issuers’ own summary of the riskiness of each account. 
We will assess the relative importance of these variables in predicting default. Note that if the 
credit scores are sufficient statistics for default, no other variables available to the issuers should 
be significant predictors given the scores. Furthermore, econi,t controls for local economic 
conditions like the unemployment rate, per capita income, and the poverty rate in the state in 
which the account holder resides (unemployment, average_income, and poverty_rate, 
respectively); the fraction of people in the state without health insurance (no_insurance), and the 
median real new house price in the corresponding census region (house_prices). While 
unemployment is available monthly, house_prices and average_income are measured quarterly, 
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 Consider the following example. Suppose one observes that the 1995 cohort had a greater default rate when it was 
2 years old (in 1997) than the 1990 cohort had when it was 2 years old (in 1992). This could be due to a cohort 
effect, if the 1995 cohort was riskier, at any age, than the 1990 cohort, as suggested by Figure 2. Alternatively, this 
could be due to a time effect, if all accounts in 1997 were more likely to default than were accounts in 1992, 
whatever their cohort and age, as suggested by Figure 1. 
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and no_insurance and poverty_rate only annually. Monthly values for the latter four variables 
were linearly interpolated.17 
The age polynomial and the risk measures riski,t together control for the risk-composition 
of credit card accounts and therefore for the risk effect. If recently booked accounts have 
sufficiently worse risk characteristics, this could explain the rise in default, as under the risk 
effect. The time dummies identify changes over time in the average propensity to default that are 
not due to risk-composition or other economic fundamentals. Hence the time dummies capture 
the demand effect, including omitted factors like changes in default costs which affect people’s 
willingness to default. It is of course possible that the time dummies are picking up some other 
measure of risk or other economic fundamental that we have not controlled for. However, Eq. (1) 
already contains a much richer set of controls than is available in the data used in previous 
studies. In particular, the controls include the variables tracked by the card issuers themselves, 
who have strong incentives to measure risk accurately, and thereby control for credit supply. 
Further, in light of the strength of the economy over the sample period, most other unmeasured 
economic fundamentals improved over time and therefore would be unlikely to increase default 
rates.  
There are multiple possible timing conventions that could be used for the risk controls 
riski,t in Eq. (1). To identify changes in booking standards over time, they might naturally be 
taken from the original time of application. However, application data would not control for 
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 We also considered median family income and the divorce rate in each state, both available only annually. Median 
income was generally insignificant, and since average_income is available at higher frequency we use the latter 
instead in the reported specifications. The coefficient on the divorce rate was significantly positive in the bankruptcy 
models below, but did not quantitatively change the marginal effects measured by Eqs. (2) and (3). The divorce rate 
was insignificant in the delinquency models however. Because the divorce variable (which comes from the 
Department of Health and Human Services) is missing for a number of states, we do not include it in the reported 
specifications. We verified that omitting it does not change our conclusions. 
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changes in risk-composition or economic conditions between the time of application and the start 
of the sample. For example, the 1990-91 recession might have had lingering effects on people’s 
ability to pay their debts. Taking the risk controls from the time of application would attribute all 
of this variation to the demand effect. Also, some issuers did not store some of their application 
variables, especially for the older accounts. 
Instead, for the main results the risk controls are all taken from June 1995, the month 
before the start of the sample period (that is, month t=0). While the polynomial agei,t non-
parametrically controls for the time-varying component of account risk, riski,0 controls for the 
fixed component, more completely than the fixed cohort dummies used in Figure 2. Formally, 
agei,t allows for duration-dependence in the baseline hazard function: the (conditional) 
probability of default can vary over time as account i, of fixed characteristics riski,0, ages. riski,0 
allows this hazard function to shift across accounts that start the sample period with different risk 
characteristics.18 In extensions we will also interact agei,t and riski,0, which will allow the hazard 
functions to have non-parametrically different shapes across the different risk groups. 
Given this specification, to test for the risk effect we will essentially check whether the 
sample trends in default can be explained by riskier accounts progressing through the riskier parts 
of their life cycle (e.g., around their two-year birthday). For instance, suppose that many of the 
youngest accounts in the sample, those opened in early 1995, have bad risk characteristics riski,0. 
Then, ceteris paribus, the default rate might have increased in 1997 because the risky (and 
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 More formally, let g(a) be a fifth-order polynomial in account age a, in months, corresponding to agei,t. The 
hazard function λi(a) ≡ Pr(D i,a = 1| D i,a-1 = 0)  is the probability of defaulting at age a conditional on not having 
defaulted before. Eq. (1) implies that λi,t(a) = λ(b0’timet + g(a) + b2’riski,0 +  b3’econi,t), where the functional form 
λ() depends on whether we are using the probit or logit estimator. Thus the hazard function is allowed to vary with 
both age a and the risk characteristics riski,0, as well as with time and economic conditions. Such a specification of 
the hazard function is standard in the literatures on the duration of unemployment and welfare spells. There the 
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relatively large) 1995 cohort of accounts hit its two-year birthday in 1997. By contrast, to test for 
the demand effect, we will check whether all accounts – even accounts with the same risk 
characteristics, age, and other economic fundamentals – have become more likely to default over 
time. Using riski,0 is also appropriate from the point of view of a lender (or investor) who at time 
0 is trying to forecast future default rates in a portfolio. Forecasting over a two-year horizon is 
consistent with industry practice; in particular the credit risk scores are usually calibrated on two-
year samples. 
Another possible timing convention would be to use updated, contemporary risk controls, 
riski,t. But updating the risk controls would confound the risk and demand effects because many 
of the risk variables are under the direct control of the account holder. For instance, people could 
have chosen to take on more debt over the course of the sample period because the stigma of 
default has fallen. Using riski,t would attribute all of this variation to the risk effect, thereby 
understating the demand effect. One of the variables in riski,t, however, is directly under the 
control of the issuers, namely the credit line. Therefore we sometimes replace the initial line, 
linei,0, with the updated line (once lagged), linei,t-1, keeping the other, demand-determined risk 
controls at their initial (t=0) values. This allows us to test whether increases in credit lines – the 
intensive margin of credit supply – have contributed to the default rate during the sample 
period.19 
At the national level, credit supply also changed during the sample period along the 
extensive margin, through the introduction of new accounts. Since our sample is representative 
of accounts already open in mid 1995, it does not include accounts that opened subsequently. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
analogues of age a and riski,0 are the length of the unemployment spell so far and the characteristics of the 
unemployed person, usually time-invariant demographic variables like gender and race. (See e.g. Hoynes (1999).) 
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Hence the results do not include the contribution of these youngest accounts to national default 
rates between mid 1995 and mid 1997. However, this is not a problem for our analysis. The 
demand effect should be similar across different accounts, and the results will fully capture the 
contribution of the risk-composition of the accounts that are in the sample, to the default rates in 
the sample. 
Both dynamic probit and logit models of Eq. (1) were estimated. Because the results were 
both qualitatively and quantitatively similar, we report only the probit results. The standard errors 
allow for heteroscedasticity across accounts as well as serial correlation within accounts. Dummy 
variables for the issuers are included but not reported. Various extensions of Eq. (1) will also be 
considered. 
To evaluate quantitatively how changes in the risk and demand effects influenced the 
probability of default, we want to compute the marginal value of varying each effect 
independently, at different times in the sample period. This requires a generalization of the 
marginal effects that are usually computed [e.g., Greene (1991), p. 664]. Let Φ  be the normal 
CDF (for the probit specification), and for any variable x let ∑
=
=
N
i
titi xN
x
1
,,
1 be the cross-sectional 
mean of x in quarter t. We can naturally define the marginal value of the demand effect to be the 
effect on default rates of varying only the time dummies, holding all other variables in Eq. (1), 
which control for credit supply and other aspects of risk-composition, equal to their cross-
sectional means. As a baseline, marginal values will be calculated relative to the first quarter 
(1995:Q3). Thus, the marginal effect of the change in the demand effect between quarter 1 and 
quarter t is calculated as 
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 Of course the issuers endogenously choose the credit lines on the basis of account holders’ past behavior, so using 
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Symmetrically, we define the marginal effect of changing risk-composition over time to be the 
effect of varying all variables other than the time dummies, again evaluating at cross-sectional 
means: 
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Standard errors for demandt and riskcompt are calculated using the delta method. 
It is important to understand exactly what riskcompt and demandt measure. First, to 
emphasize the difference between changes in the demand effect and changes in standard 
economic fundamentals, we include in riskcompt the effects of changes in economic conditions, 
by varying econi,t. Second, since riski,0 identifies the fixed component of each account’s risk, it 
does not directly contribute to variation in risk-composition over the sample period. As a result, 
in the baseline specification, the changes in riskcompt over time are driven by changes in the 
variable, hazard-rate component of risk-composition, agei,t, and in econi,t. Once we have used 
riski,0 to control for the fixed component of account risk, our identification scheme allows us to 
treat the marginal effects of risk and demand symmetrically, by using the polynomial in duration 
agei,t to control for changes in risk over time, and the dummy variables timet to measure changes 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
even the updated line could understate the demand effect.  
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in the demand effect over time. For a given risk group, identified by the account-specific 
measures of risk in riski,0, both age and time are allowed to have a non-parametric effect on the 
probability of default over time.  
 
4. Results 
 
Column (1) of Table 2 shows the baseline results from the probit model for bankruptcy. 
The estimated coefficients for the quarter dummies and age polynomial are followed by the 
coefficients for the risk controls and local economic conditions. Starting with the latter at the 
bottom of the column, the unemployment rate unemployment and house prices house_prices are 
significant with the expected signs:  greater unemployment and weaker house prices are 
associated with more bankruptcies. The risk controls are jointly very significant. Because the 
credit scores are important summary statistics for risk, both their levels and squares are included. 
The issuers estimate the scores using all the information at their disposal, both in-house (the 
"internal" scores, based on the past behavior of the individual account) and at the credit bureaus 
(the "external" scores, based on the behavior of the account holder across all sources of credit). 
We use both scores. For each score the linear and quadratic terms are together quite significant, 
with χ2(2) statistics well over 100. Their total effect has the expected sign:  accounts with higher 
scores are much less likely to go bankrupt. The remaining risk controls include account total 
balances, payments, and purchases, all normalized by the credit line, and the line itself. The 
normalized balance, defined as the utilization rate, is specified flexibly as a series of dummy 
variables: utilization1 to utilization7 represent a utilization rate of 0, in (0,0.4], (0.4,0.7], 
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(0.7,0.8], (0.8,0.9], and (0.9,1.0], and over 1.0, respectively.20 Not surprisingly, accounts with 
higher utilization rates are much more likely to go bankrupt. Accounts making smaller payments 
or larger purchases also go bankrupt more often, although the latter effect is not significant. Since 
variables other than the credit scores are statistically significant, the scores appear to be 
inefficient predictors of default. The coefficient on the line is insignificant, but will be discussed 
further below, along with additional risk controls. The age variables are jointly significant, with 
the associated age hazard function rising for young accounts but then flattening out compared to 
Figure 1. 
As for the time dummies, their coefficients are highly significant and increase 
monotonically. Thus, even after controlling for account age, balance, purchase and payment 
history, credit line, risk scores, and economic conditions, a given account was more likely to go 
bankrupt in 1996 and 1997 than in 1995. Some other systematic default factor must have 
deteriorated, consistent with the demand effect. 
To quantify the relative importance of the risk and demand effects over time, we compute 
their marginal values, riskcompt and demandt, for each quarter. The results appear in column (1) 
of Table 3, and are graphed in Figure 3. riskcompt is initially flat and then declines. As expected 
the aging of the portfolio and improvements in economic conditions imply a decrease in the 
bankruptcy rate over time. The time dummies essentially capture the difference between this 
implied bankruptcy rate and the actual rate in the sample. The rising trend in demandt suggests 
that the actual rate is increasingly larger than the implied rate. The magnitudes are much larger 
than for riskcompt and are statistically and economically significant. The probability of 
bankruptcy in quarter eight is about 0.06 percentage points per month larger than at the start of 
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 Because the credit limit constrains the magnitude of total balances, including transactions balances, not just debt, 
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the sample. At an annual rate this translates to more than a 0.7 percentage point increase in the 
bankruptcy rate, ceteris paribus, a substantial effect. 
Another way to illustrate the magnitude of the demand effect is to contrast it with the 
effect of reducing the credit score of every account in the sample by one standard deviation. This 
represents a very large increase in the overall riskiness of the sample portfolio of credit cards. A 
one standard deviation decrease in the internal risk score raises the average probability of 
bankruptcy by about 0.10 percentage points per month, not very much larger than the peak value 
of demandt in quarter eight. Thus, the estimated demand effect increased the bankruptcy rate by 
almost as much as had the entire portfolio become one standard deviation riskier – again a 
substantial effect. We similarly computed the effects of varying the other risk controls. The 
values for demandt are always large in comparison. 
The remaining columns of Table 2 present various extensions of this analysis of 
bankruptcy. The associated marginal effects appear in the corresponding columns in Table 3. 
Column (2) shows the effects of interacting the age polynomial with all of the risk controls 
riski,0, which allows the hazard functions to have non-parametrically different shapes across 
different risk groups.21 The coefficients reported in Table 2 are for the primary, non-interacted 
variables. The interaction terms are significant for utilization, payments, purchases, and the 
internal risk scores. In Table 3 the associated marginal values demandt have decreased by about 
one-quarter in magnitude relative to baseline column (1), but they remain significant and 
continue to rise over time. The marginal values riskcompt now rise slightly through quarter 4 but 
then decline.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
we include total balances in the numerator of utilization. The results are similar using just debt in the numerator. 
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Turning to the intensive margin of credit supply, credit lines increased substantially over 
the sample period, on average over 60%. Column (3) in Tables 2 and 3 shows the results of 
adding to Eq. (1) the updated credit line, linei,t-1. The other, demand-determined risk controls are 
maintained at their initial values. The coefficient on the credit line is significant but negative, 
implying that larger lines are associated with less default. This reflects the fact that issuers 
offered greater amounts of credit to the people that they expected to be less risky. The 
coefficients on the time dummies and their marginal values demandt do not change very much. 
These findings suggest that larger credit lines were not responsible for the recent rise in default.22  
Column (4) extends this analysis by updating all of the risk controls, using riski,t-j for a 
fixed number of lags j. Although this extension confounds the risk and demand effects by 
attributing some demand-related changes in default rates to the risk controls, it is still interesting 
for comparative purposes. However it is not clear how many lags j would be most appropriate. In 
the year or so before default, many people significantly increase their debt (e.g. utilization rates 
often asymptote to 100%) and miss payments. Hence using a very small j would make riski,t-j 
statistically very informative, but economically irrelevant, since lenders need to predict default 
earlier than just a few months in advance, before debt increases. In practice lenders often forecast 
over 24 month horizons. But using riski,t-24 would eliminate all but the final month of the sample. 
As a compromise we use j = 6 lags, adding riski,t-6 to Eq. (1), at the cost of dropping quarters one 
and two of the sample period.  
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 For computational ease and to minimize collinearity in the interaction terms, the reported results interact riski,0 
with a quadratic polynomial in age, and use a quadratic function of utilization in riski,0 instead of the six dummy 
variables. The results are similar using the fifth-order polynomial in age and the utilization dummies variables. 
22
 For a subset of accounts we have credit bureau data on the number of other credit cards the account holder has. 
The average account holder opened about one new account over the sample period. We added this variable, once 
lagged, to Eq. (1). For bankruptcy, its coefficient was significantly positive; however the marginal values demandt 
declined by only about five percent in magnitude. For delinquency, below, its coefficient was significantly negative 
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The results are reported in column (4). The coefficients are qualitatively similar to the 
baseline results in column (1), though, not surprisingly, much more significant.23 Nonetheless the 
time dummies and their marginal values demandt remain jointly quite significant and generally 
increasing. To interpret their magnitude, note that having dropped the first two quarters from the 
sample, the omitted time dummy is for quarter 3. Hence the marginals demandt in column (4) of 
Table 3 can be compared to the differences (demandt - demand3) from column (1). In column (4) 
the peak value of demandt in quarter 8 is .018%, almost half the size of the corresponding value 
in column (1) of .043% (= .060% - .017%).24 This decline in the magnitude of demandt is not 
surprising since riski,t-6 incorporates borrowers’ risky behavior within the sample period. 
However, since this behavior is endogenous, using riski,t-6 does not help identify the cause of the 
trends in default in the sample; it merely reflects them, confounding the risk and demand effects. 
As already noted, people might have taken on more debt over the sample period and then 
defaulted because the costs of default had decreased. 
Column (5) adds dummy variables for the state in which the cardholder resides. These 
variables control for fixed geographical effects on the propensity to default. For instance, 
additional credit might have recently been obtained by riskier households living in poorer areas. 
Similarly, regulations, judicial attitudes, and average household demographics, as well as default 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
by contrast. Note that the number of credit cards a person holds incorporates both supply effects and demand effects 
(i.e., the person’s decision to accept credit card offers). 
23
 The t-ratios for high levels of utilization are above 10, the χ2(2) statistic for the significance of the internal scores 
has almost doubled, and the pseudo R2 has increased by almost 50%. The results are similar on controlling for 
possible drift in the scores by normalizing them by the average score in the month. 
24 Dropping the first two quarters but still using riski,0, as opposed to  riski,t-6, resulted in a peak value for demandt  of 
about .045%, consistent with the original results in column (1). 
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costs like stigma, can differ across states. The state dummies are jointly quite significant (not 
shown), but nonetheless slightly raise the magnitudes of demandt.25  
As discussed above, it is difficult to operationalize more directly the various notions of 
the demand effect that have been proposed. Some of these emphasize the idea that social stigma 
and information about bankruptcy might change with the number of people in one’s community, 
appropriately defined, that have already filed for bankruptcy. To operationalize this geographic 
view of default costs we use the aggregate bankruptcy rate in the state in which the cardholder 
resides. Column (6) adds to Eq. (1) the average of this rate over the previous two calendar 
quarters, denoted by stateratet-1, plus its square. These variables are quite significant and their 
total effect is positive, as expected. The probability that someone files for bankruptcy increases 
with the number of people in her state who filed in the recent past. Furthermore, the marginal 
values demandt have decreased to about two-thirds of their baseline values in column (1).26  
These results support the geographic view of default costs. The omitted default factor varies 
systematically across states. Of course, the relevant community within which stigma operates and 
information flows might not be one’s state, so these results can be considered a lower bound for 
their effect.  
The same analysis was undertaken using account delinquency instead of bankruptcy as 
the indicator of default. Tables 4 and 5 present the results for the different specifications and their 
corresponding marginal values. In the baseline specification, in column (1), the pattern of 
coefficients on the risk controls is similar to that above for bankruptcy. Now no_insurance is 
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 A conditional logit model was estimated to remove fixed effects by zip code, as well. The results were similar. 
26
 We also added one, two, and six month’s worth of lags of econi,t to this and the other main specifications. For 
bankruptcy these lags were generally insignificant and had very little effect on the demandt marginals and the 
significance of stateratet-1. For delinquency, below, a few of the lags were significant (though unstable in sign) but 
again had little effect on demandt. 
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significant, with lack of health insurance associated with more delinquency. Once again people 
with larger balances and lower risk scores are much more likely to default. Even with these 
controls for risk, the coefficients on the time dummies are again highly significant. Figure 4 
graphs the corresponding marginal values. demandt rises for six quarters, but unlike for 
bankruptcy it then plateaus. (The magnitudes are larger than in Figure 3 because delinquency is 
more common than bankruptcy.) The peak value in quarter six of about 0.21 translates into 
almost a 3 percentage point increase in the annual delinquency rate, ceteris paribus. For 
comparison, decreasing the internal credit scores by one standard deviation raises the average 
predicted probability of delinquency by about 0.5 percentage points per month, about double the 
peak value of demandt.  
The remaining columns in Tables 4 and 5 present various extensions. Column (2) shows 
the results on interacting agei,t with riski,0. The interaction terms are significant for payments, 
purchases, and the internal scores. Again the time dummies remain significant and retain their 
original pattern, and their marginal values demandt have been reduced by about one-fifth in 
magnitude. In column (3) the updated credit line linei,t-1 is again significantly negative. In column 
(4) the updated risk controls riski,t-6 are again very significant and reduce the magnitudes of 
demandt by well over half relative to (demandt - demand3) in column (1). (The linear and 
quadratic terms for the external score are jointly very significant.) Finally, adding state dummies 
does not substantially change the results, as reported in column (5).  
For both bankruptcy and delinquency, for each issuer we added its complete set of 
available risk controls to Eq. (1). These often include variables like the income and age of the 
account holder (from the credit card application), and credit bureau variables like the total 
number of credit cards held by the account holder. While such variables are often significant in 
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predicting default, they are less significant than the credit scores and utilization, and the 
coefficients on the time dummies always remain significant and generally increasing.27,28 It 
appears that there has not been enough change in risk-composition to explain the variation in 
default rates over the sample period. These results are consistent with the demand effect.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper used a unique new panel data set of credit card accounts to analyze credit card 
delinquency and more generally personal bankruptcy and the stability of credit risk models. We 
estimated duration models for consumer default and assessed the relative importance of different 
variables in predicting default. We also investigated how the propensity to default has changed 
over time, disentangling the two leading explanations for the recent increase in default – changes 
in risk-composition versus the demand effect, namely an increase in borrowers’ willingness to 
default due to declines in default costs, including social, information, and legal costs. Our data 
contains a much richer set of measures of risk-composition than previously available, including 
debt levels, purchase and payment histories, credit lines, and credit risk scores. Since these 
measures include the information that credit card issuers themselves use to measure risk, we were 
able to control for all changes in credit supply and risk-composition that were observable by the 
issuers, including increases in credit lines.  
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 For example, for bankruptcy both account-holder age and income have a negative coefficient, but are not 
significant given the other covariates. (We first deflated application income to constant dollars, and then applied a 
real growth rate of 2.5% per year to allow for income growth between the time of application and the sample.) In 
both cases the demandt marginals declined only slightly, by about 1 percent in magnitude. The results for 
delinquency were similar, though the negative coefficient on age was significant. 
28
 We also interacted the quarter dummies with an indicator for having high income (above the median). The trend in 
the time dummies was somewhat smaller in magnitude for the high income account holders than for the others, but 
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The risk controls were highly significant in predicting both bankruptcy and delinquency. 
Accounts with lower credit scores were much more likely to default. Even controlling for the 
scores, accounts with larger balances and purchases, or smaller payments, were also more likely 
to default. Default also increased with unemployment, weak house prices, and lack of health 
insurance. Larger credit lines however were not associated with default, suggesting that issuers 
extended the larger lines to less risky accounts. Nonetheless, despite their significance, these 
variables explain only a small part of the change in bankruptcy and delinquency rates over the 
sample period. In sum, neither the risk-composition of accounts nor economic conditions 
changed enough to explain the trends in default rates.  
Instead, the relation between default and economic fundamentals appears to have 
substantially changed over the period. Even after controlling for risk-composition and other 
economic fundamentals, the propensity to default significantly increased between mid 1995 and 
mid 1997. Ceteris paribus, a credit card holder in 1997 was almost 1 percentage point more 
likely to declare bankruptcy and 3 percentage points more likely to go delinquent than a 
cardholder with identical risk characteristics in 1995. These magnitudes are almost as large as if 
the entire population of cardholders had become one standard deviation riskier, as measured by 
risk scores. Standard default models appear to have missed an important, systematic and time-
varying default factor. Because this factor is not explained by our very rich set of controls for risk 
and credit supply, nor by other economic fundamentals, these results are consistent with the 
demand effect. 
While our analysis rules out the risk effect, it does not directly identify what underlies the 
estimated demand effect. The fact that the omitted default factor rises with the number of people 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
not significantly so. However, these interaction terms are hard to interpret in our empirical framework because they 
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in one’s state who have previously filed for bankruptcy is suggestive of a decline in social stigma 
or information costs, but is not conclusive. Further, the demand and risk effects can be 
interrelated. It is possible, for instance, that a previous deterioration in risk-composition or 
economic fundamentals caused a critical mass of people to declare bankruptcy, leading in turn to 
a reduction in default costs. This suggests the possibility of multiple equilibria in default rates. 
Also, lenders would likely respond to the demand effect by tightening lending standards and so 
improving the risk-composition of borrowers. Furthermore, our analysis does not provide a 
forecast about the future path of default. Nevertheless, if the demand effect is due to recent 
reductions in social or information costs, it will most likely be difficult to return the bankruptcy 
rate back to its previous levels before the 1990s, without a substantial tightening in lending 
standards or the bankruptcy code.29 And if default costs in turn decrease with the number of 
people that have already defaulted, future recessions could further ratchet up default rates.  
This analysis can be extended in a number of ways. First, the authors are attempting to 
collect additional data to lengthen the sample period. Second, better predictors of default might 
be constructed. Evidently the credit risk scores did not fully predict the recent increase in default 
rates. Since variables other than the scores were also found to be significant in predicting default, 
the scores might not even be efficient predictors. Better predictors might improve credit risk 
management and lead to a more efficient allocation of credit. Further, the standard risk scores do 
not summarize the expected future profitability of accounts. “Profit scores” might be constructed 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
confound the risk and demand effects. 
29
 Increased defaults raise the marginal costs of lending. If marginal revenues do not increase correspondingly, for 
instance if lenders are constrained in raising interest rates, then one would expect less lending in response. Credit 
card issuers have recently tightened lending standards, apparently in response to increased losses over our sample 
period. In conjunction with an ever improving economy, this might have helped recently stem the rise in the 
bankruptcy rate, but it remains high by historical standards [Moody’s (1999)]. Also, there is an “inventory” issue that 
might put some downwards pressure on the bankruptcy rate in the future: most bankrupts file under Chapter 7, which 
does not allow them to file again for another six years. 
 29
to combine default probabilities with expected future cash flows. Third, because the estimated 
demand effect represents an increase in the probability of default that is common across 
accounts, it would be interesting to examine its implications for portfolio diversification and 
securitization. Fourth, in a companion paper, Gross and Souleles (2001), the authors investigate 
more generally how people use their credit cards, including how they respond to changes in credit 
supply. Understanding why people accumulate large quantities of debt in the first place should 
shed additional light on why some people default.30  
 
                                                           
30
 Jappelli, Pischke, and Souleles (1998) document the consumption-smoothing benefits of credit-cards and other 
forms of consumer credit. Gross (1997) performs an analogous exercise for firms’ investment. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 
 
variable 
 
mean 
25th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
    
age 20.5 11 26 
utilization 0.45 0.04 0.85 
payments 0.045 0.000 0.035 
purchases 0.037 0.000 0.034 
line 4914 3000 6000 
internal_score 714 681 750 
external_score 699 658 746 
unemployment 0.055 0.049 0.063 
no_insurance 0.149 0.110 0.184 
house_prices 93.9 81.7 93.2 
average_income 15.6 14.1 16.8 
poverty_rate 0.133 0.106 0.165 
BK 0.020 0 0 
DEL 0.082 0 0 
 
This table provides summary statistics for some of the key variables in the analysis. age represents 
a credit card account’s age in months, line its credit limit. The utilization rate is balances divided 
by the line. payments and purchases are also normalized by the line. internal_score and 
external_score are the credit risk scores from the issuer and credit bureau. unemployment, 
average_income, and poverty_rate are the unemployment rate, per capita income (in thousands of 
$), and poverty rate in the state of residence; no_insure is the fraction of people in the state without 
health insurance; and house_prices is the median real new house price in the census region (in 
thousands of $). BK is an indicator for bankruptcy, DEL for three-cycle delinquency. Apart from 
BK and DEL, the statistics refer to the first month of the sample period.  The reported statistics for 
BK and DEL measure the probability of ever going bankrupt or delinquent at any point in the 
sample period. These statistics cover both the bankruptcy and delinquency samples (3929 bankrupt 
and 13872 delinquent accounts, plus a control group of 9821 non-defaulting accounts), and are 
weighted to be representative. 
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Table 2 
Dynamic Probit Models of Bankruptcy 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
      baseline specification             interact with age                update credit line         
  
coef. 
 
s.e. 
 
p-val 
 
coef. 
 
s.e. 
 
p-val 
 
coef. 
 
s.e. 
 
p-val 
quarter2 0.136 0.024 0.000 0.148 0.025 0.000 0.136 0.024 0.000 
quarter3 0.168 0.025 0.000 0.184 0.026 0.000 0.170 0.025 0.000 
quarter4 0.237 0.026 0.000 0.258 0.028 0.000 0.240 0.026 0.000 
quarter5 0.255 0.029 0.000 0.271 0.030 0.000 0.257 0.029 0.000 
quarter6 0.286 0.030 0.000 0.298 0.031 0.000 0.291 0.030 0.000 
quarter7 0.334 0.031 0.000 0.343 0.032 0.000 0.344 0.032 0.000 
quarter8 0.388 0.033 0.000 0.394 0.033 0.000 0.401 0.033 0.000 
age 0.015 0.024 0.550 -0.230 0.053 0.000 0.014 0.024 0.556 
age2 -0.028 0.144 0.846 0.179 0.163 0.271 -0.022 0.144 0.880 
age3 0.009 0.382 0.982 0.152 0.407 0.709 -0.019 0.382 0.961 
age4 0.010 0.462 0.983 -0.119 0.490 0.808 0.054 0.462 0.907 
age5 -0.001 0.206 0.995 0.040 0.218 0.853 -0.025 0.206 0.904 
utilization2 0.067 0.038 0.079 0.011 0.046 0.806 0.076 0.038 0.046 
utilization3 0.282 0.040 0.000 0.106 0.069 0.125 0.291 0.040 0.000 
utilization4 0.277 0.045 0.000 0.069 0.077 0.370 0.288 0.045 0.000 
utilization5 0.363 0.042 0.000 0.139 0.080 0.084 0.370 0.042 0.000 
utilization6 0.506 0.040 0.000 0.271 0.087 0.002 0.512 0.040 0.000 
utilization7 0.544 0.050 0.000 0.316 0.100 0.002 0.543 0.050 0.000 
payments -0.956 0.176 0.000 -6.928 1.651 0.000 -0.970 0.179 0.000 
purchases 0.156 0.093 0.091 1.060 0.375 0.005 0.143 0.092 0.121 
line -1.3E-6 3.4E-6 0.695 5.0E-6 1.3E-5 0.699 -1.3E-5 3.0E-6 0.000 
internal_score -0.029 0.005 0.000 -0.030 0.006 0.000 -0.029 0.006 0.000 
internal_score2 0.018 0.004 0.000 0.014 0.004 0.001 0.019 0.004 0.000 
external_score 0.019 0.003 0.000 0.019 0.003 0.000 0.019 0.003 0.000 
external_score2 -0.017 0.002 0.000 -0.016 0.002 0.000 -0.017 0.002 0.000 
unemployment 5.256 1.109 0.000 5.006 1.116 0.000 5.466 1.113 0.000 
no_insurance 0.452 0.280 0.107 0.477 0.285 0.094 0.479 0.284 0.092 
house_prices -0.002 0.001 0.037 -0.002 0.001 0.043 -0.002 0.001 0.048 
average_income -0.001 0.007 0.834 -0.001 0.007 0.863 -0.001 0.007 0.913 
poverty_rate -0.776 0.469 0.098 -0.827 0.481 0.086 -0.821 0.477 0.085 
          
          
# of obs  218025   218025   218025  
log likelihood  -1786.9   -1779.9   -1785.6  
pseudo R2  0.126   0.129   0.127  
          
 
This table shows the results of probit models of bankruptcy (BK) using monthly credit-card account 
panel data from July 1995 through June 1997. The independent variables control for time effects, 
account age, measures of account risk, and local economic conditions. quarter2 to quarter8 are dummy 
variables for the calendar quarter. age to age5 represent a fifth-order polynomial in account age. 
utilization2 to utilization7 are dummy variables for successively higher utilization rates. line is the credit 
limit, and payments and purchases are normalized by the line. internal_score and external_score are the 
credit risk scores. unemployment, average_income, and poverty_rate are the unemployment rate, per 
capita income, and poverty rate in the state of residence, no_insure the fraction of people without health 
insurance, and house_prices the median real new house price in the region. Coefficients on dummy 
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variables for the issuer are not shown. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
dependence within accounts. The number of observations is the number of account-months. agen = agen-
1
*age/100. external_score2 = external_score*external_score/1000. internal_score2 = internal_score* internal_score  /1000. 
 
In the baseline specification in column (1) the risk controls riski,0 (utilization, payments, purchases, line, and 
the scores) are all taken from month 0, June 1995. Column (2) interacts the risk controls with a quadratic 
polynomial in account age. Only the coefficients on the primary, non-interacted variables are shown. 
Column (3) uses the updated credit limit (once lagged). Column (4) updates the risk controls using riski,t-
6. Column (5) adds dummy variables for the cardholder’s state, whose coefficients are not shown. 
staterate in column (6) is the aggregate bankruptcy rate in the state, averaged over the previous two 
calendar quarters. 
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Table 2:  
Dynamic Probit Models of Bankruptcy (ctd) 
 
 (4) (5) (6) 
      update risk controls                   state dummies               state bankruptcy rate      
   
coef. 
 
s.e. 
 
p-val 
 
coef. 
 
s.e. 
 
p-val 
 
coef. 
 
s.e. 
 
p-val 
quarter2    0.144 0.024 0.000 0.126 0.024 0.000 
quarter3    0.186 0.028 0.000 0.158 0.025 0.000 
quarter4 0.082 0.021 0.000 0.258 0.031 0.000 0.214 0.027 0.000 
quarter5 0.054 0.025 0.030 0.286 0.036 0.000 0.208 0.030 0.000 
quarter6 0.085 0.027 0.001 0.320 0.037 0.000 0.230 0.032 0.000 
quarter7 0.120 0.028 0.000 0.380 0.047 0.000 0.277 0.033 0.000 
quarter8 0.165 0.030 0.000 0.445 0.056 0.000 0.323 0.035 0.000 
age -0.067 0.041 0.101 0.010 0.025 0.689 0.017 0.025 0.490 
age2 0.361 0.226 0.111 -0.002 0.145 0.990 -0.040 0.145 0.782 
age3 -0.836 0.574 0.145 -0.059 0.386 0.878 0.029 0.385 0.939 
age4 0.872 0.668 0.192 0.092 0.468 0.845 -0.001 0.466 0.998 
age5 -0.336 0.290 0.246 -0.038 0.209 0.856 -0.002 0.208 0.992 
utilization2 0.264 0.057 0.000 0.063 0.039 0.104 0.067 0.038 0.079 
utilization3 0.453 0.060 0.000 0.278 0.040 0.000 0.282 0.040 0.000 
utilization4 0.571 0.063 0.000 0.269 0.046 0.000 0.277 0.045 0.000 
utilization5 0.625 0.061 0.000 0.360 0.043 0.000 0.363 0.042 0.000 
utilization6 0.779 0.059 0.000 0.501 0.040 0.000 0.505 0.040 0.000 
utilization7 0.865 0.064 0.000 0.540 0.050 0.000 0.542 0.050 0.000 
payments -1.959 0.449 0.000 -0.991 0.183 0.000 -0.975 0.178 0.000 
purchases 0.272 0.064 0.000 0.185 0.092 0.044 0.158 0.092 0.086 
line 7.2E-6 3.3E-6 0.028 -4.3E-6 3.5E-6 0.212 -2.5E-6 3.4E-6 0.461 
internal_score -0.040 0.005 0.000 -0.030 0.005 0.000 -0.028 0.005 0.000 
internal_score2 0.026 0.004 0.000 0.019 0.004 0.000 0.018 0.004 0.000 
external_score 0.017 0.002 0.000 0.019 0.003 0.000 0.019 0.003 0.000 
external_score2 -0.015 0.002 0.000 -0.017 0.002 0.000 -0.017 0.002 0.000 
unemployment 5.679 1.278 0.000 0.367 2.166 0.866 3.227 1.170 0.006 
no_insurance 0.567 0.311 0.068 -1.973 1.078 0.067 0.177 0.282 0.530 
house_prices -0.002 0.001 0.076 -0.007 0.006 0.182 0.000 0.001 0.795 
average_income 0.001 0.007 0.848 -0.059 0.073 0.420 -0.005 0.007 0.408 
poverty_rate -0.651 0.522 0.212 1.148 1.038 0.268 -0.237 0.466 0.612 
staterate       807 144 0.000 
staterate2        -2.9E+5 6.0E+4 0.000 
          
# of obs  152885   218025   218025  
log likelihood  -1328.1   -1778.3   -1783.8  
pseudo R2  0.176   0.130   0.127  
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Table 3 
Marginal Effects for Bankruptcy 
  
  
 
(1)  baseline 
specification 
 (2) interact  
with age 
 (3) update  
credit line 
 
  
marginal s.e. marginal s.e. marginal s.e. 
demandt       
  quarter1 0.000%   0.000%   0.000%   
  quarter2 0.013% 0.002% 0.010% 0.002% 0.013% 0.002% 
  quarter3 0.017% 0.003% 0.013% 0.002% 0.018% 0.003% 
  quarter4 0.027% 0.004% 0.022% 0.003% 0.028% 0.004% 
  quarter5 0.030% 0.004% 0.023% 0.004% 0.032% 0.005% 
  quarter6 0.036% 0.005% 0.027% 0.004% 0.038% 0.005% 
  quarter7 0.046% 0.006% 0.034% 0.005% 0.050% 0.007% 
  quarter8 0.060% 0.008% 0.044% 0.006% 0.065% 0.008% 
       
riskcompt       
  quarter1 0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  
  quarter2 0.001% 0.000% 0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
  quarter3 0.001% 0.001% 0.003% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 
  quarter4 0.001% 0.001% 0.004% 0.001% 0.000% 0.001% 
  quarter5 -0.006% 0.001% -0.001% 0.001% -0.007% 0.001% 
  quarter6 -0.006% 0.001% -0.001% 0.001% -0.007% 0.001% 
  quarter7 -0.006% 0.001% -0.001% 0.001% -0.008% 0.001% 
  quarter8 -0.007% 0.001% -0.001% 0.001% -0.009% 0.001% 
 
  
 
(4)  update risk 
controls 
 (5) state 
dummies 
 (6) state  
bankruptcy rate 
 
  
marginal s.e. marginal s.e. marginal s.e. 
demandt       
  quarter1   0.000%  0.000%   
  quarter2   0.013% 0.002% 0.011% 0.002% 
  quarter3 0.000%   0.018% 0.003% 0.015% 0.003% 
  quarter4 0.008% 0.002% 0.029% 0.005% 0.023% 0.003% 
  quarter5 0.005% 0.002% 0.034% 0.006% 0.022% 0.004% 
  quarter6 0.008% 0.003% 0.041% 0.007% 0.025% 0.004% 
  quarter7 0.012% 0.003% 0.055% 0.011% 0.033% 0.005% 
  quarter8 0.018% 0.004% 0.073% 0.017% 0.043% 0.007% 
       
riskcompt       
  quarter1   0.000%   0.000%  
  quarter2   0.000% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 
  quarter3 0.000%  0.000% 0.001% 0.002% 0.001% 
  quarter4 -0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 0.001% 0.003% 0.001% 
  quarter5 -0.008% 0.001% -0.007% 0.001% -0.003% 0.001% 
  quarter6 -0.007% 0.001% -0.007% 0.002% -0.003% 0.001% 
  quarter7 -0.006% 0.001% -0.008% 0.002% -0.003% 0.001% 
  quarter8 -0.006% 0.001% -0.009% 0.002% -0.003% 0.002% 
Each column reports the marginal effects for the probit models in the corresponding column in Table 2, 
as defined by Eqs. (2) and (3). demandt shows the effect on bankruptcy rates of varying only the time 
dummies across quarters t, relative to the first quarter. riskcompt shows the effect of varying account age 
and the economic control variables across their cross-sectional averages in different quarters. The units 
are in percentage points per month. 
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Table 4 
Dynamic Probit Models of Delinquency 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
       baseline specification             interact with age                update credit line         
   
coef. 
 
s.e. 
 
p-val 
 
coef. 
 
s.e. 
 
p-val 
 
coef. 
 
s.e. 
 
p-val 
quarter2 0.221 0.014 0.000 0.237 0.014 0.000 0.222 0.014 0.000 
quarter3 0.257 0.015 0.000 0.276 0.016 0.000 0.261 0.015 0.000 
quarter4 0.255 0.017 0.000 0.275 0.018 0.000 0.263 0.017 0.000 
quarter5 0.339 0.020 0.000 0.354 0.020 0.000 0.350 0.020 0.000 
quarter6 0.387 0.021 0.000 0.398 0.022 0.000 0.407 0.021 0.000 
quarter7 0.391 0.023 0.000 0.398 0.023 0.000 0.422 0.023 0.000 
quarter8 0.368 0.024 0.000 0.373 0.025 0.000 0.406 0.025 0.000 
age 0.060 0.016 0.000 -0.115 0.039 0.003 0.062 0.016 0.000 
age2 -0.347 0.099 0.000 -0.147 0.113 0.193 -0.357 0.099 0.000 
age3 0.871 0.273 0.001 0.789 0.277 0.004 0.882 0.274 0.001 
age4 -0.999 0.340 0.003 -0.864 0.343 0.012 -0.998 0.341 0.003 
age5 0.428 0.155 0.006 0.360 0.156 0.021 0.422 0.156 0.007 
utilization2 0.014 0.022 0.539 0.035 0.027 0.202 0.030 0.022 0.173 
utilization3 0.036 0.026 0.172 0.052 0.044 0.238 0.051 0.026 0.051 
utilization4 0.025 0.031 0.430 0.024 0.052 0.643 0.043 0.032 0.178 
utilization5 0.042 0.029 0.152 0.024 0.055 0.659 0.056 0.029 0.057 
utilization6 0.130 0.027 0.000 0.093 0.061 0.130 0.142 0.027 0.000 
utilization7 0.179 0.038 0.000 0.136 0.074 0.066 0.183 0.038 0.000 
payments -0.943 0.096 0.000 -4.007 0.666 0.000 -0.950 0.098 0.000 
purchases 0.523 0.079 0.000 1.044 0.243 0.000 0.512 0.078 0.000 
line -2.2E-5 3.0E-6 0.000 -4.3E-5 1.0E-5 0.000 -3.3E-5 2.6E-6 0.000 
internal_score -0.035 0.004 0.000 -0.032 0.004 0.000 -0.036 0.004 0.000 
internal_score2 0.021 0.003 0.000 0.015 0.003 0.000 0.022 0.003 0.000 
external_score 0.002 0.002 0.325 0.002 0.002 0.311 0.002 0.002 0.479 
external_score2 -0.004 0.002 0.015 -0.004 0.002 0.017 -0.003 0.002 0.041 
unemployment 0.545 0.923 0.555 0.337 0.928 0.717 0.723 0.930 0.437 
no_insurance 0.662 0.259 0.011 0.691 0.262 0.008 0.685 0.265 0.010 
house_prices 0.000 0.001 0.853 0.000 0.001 0.760 0.000 0.001 0.816 
average_income 0.003 0.006 0.592 0.003 0.007 0.655 0.004 0.007 0.528 
poverty_rate -0.216 0.430 0.615 -0.276 0.440 0.530 -0.242 0.440 0.582 
           
          
# of obs  337558   337558   337558  
log likelihood  -7466.7   -7448.1   -7445.9  
pseudo R2  0.139   0.141   0.141  
          
 
This table shows the results of probit models of delinquency (DEL) using monthly credit-card account 
panel data from July 1995 through June 1997. The independent variables control for time effects, 
account age, measures of account risk, and local economic conditions. quarter2 to quarter8 are dummy 
variables for the calendar quarter. age to age5 represent a fifth-order polynomial in account age. 
utilization2 to utilization7 are dummy variables for successively higher utilization rates. line is the credit 
limit, and payments and purchases are normalized by the line. internal_score and external_score are the 
credit risk scores. unemployment, average_income, and poverty_rate are the unemployment rate, per 
capita income, and poverty rate in the state of residence, no_insure the fraction of people without health 
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insurance, and house_prices the median real new house price in the region. Coefficients on dummy 
variables for the issuer are not shown. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
dependence within accounts. The number of observations is the number of account-months. agen = agen-
1
*age/100. external_score2 = external_score*external_score/1000. internal_score2 = internal_score* internal_score  /1000. 
 
In the baseline specification in column (1) the risk controls riski,0 (utilization, payments, purchases, line, and 
the scores) are all taken from month 0, June 1995. Column (2) interacts the risk controls with a quadratic 
polynomial in account age. Only the coefficients on the primary, non-interacted variables are shown. 
Column (3) uses the updated credit limit (once lagged). Column (4) updates the risk controls using riski,t-
6. Column (5) adds dummy variables for the cardholder’s state, whose coefficients are not shown. 
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Table 4 
Dynamic Probit Models of Delinquency (ctd) 
 
 (4) (5) 
      update risk controls                   state dummies        
   
coef. 
 
s.e. 
 
p-val 
 
coef. 
 
s.e. 
 
p-val 
quarter2    0.220 0.014 0.000 
quarter3    0.249 0.017 0.000 
quarter4 -0.009 0.013 0.474 0.242 0.020 0.000 
quarter5 0.042 0.016 0.008 0.326 0.023 0.000 
quarter6 0.060 0.017 0.000 0.373 0.025 0.000 
quarter7 0.059 0.019 0.002 0.362 0.032 0.000 
quarter8 0.034 0.021 0.112 0.327 0.037 0.000 
age -0.020 0.028 0.458 0.052 0.016 0.001 
age2 0.070 0.158 0.659 -0.307 0.099 0.002 
age3 -0.116 0.408 0.777 0.776 0.273 0.005 
age4 0.086 0.484 0.859 -0.896 0.340 0.008 
age5 -0.021 0.213 0.923 0.387 0.155 0.013 
utilization2 0.020 0.022 0.377 0.011 0.022 0.619 
utilization3 0.034 0.026 0.193 0.032 0.026 0.216 
utilization4 0.080 0.030 0.007 0.020 0.032 0.522 
utilization5 0.098 0.028 0.000 0.038 0.029 0.197 
utilization6 0.183 0.026 0.000 0.126 0.027 0.000 
utilization7 0.280 0.031 0.000 0.184 0.037 0.000 
payments -1.017 0.097 0.000 -0.940 0.095 0.000 
purchases 0.470 0.041 0.000 0.542 0.077 0.000 
line  -1.5E-5 2.7E-6 0.000 -2.3E-5 3.0E-6 0.000 
internal_score -0.020 0.004 0.000 -0.036 0.004 0.000 
internal_score2 0.009 0.003 0.001 0.021 0.003 0.000 
external_score -0.001 0.002 0.594 0.002 0.002 0.280 
external_score2 -0.002 0.001 0.155 -0.004 0.002 0.010 
unemployment -0.552 1.015 0.587 -1.084 1.453 0.456 
no_insurance 0.486 0.260 0.061 -0.396 0.699 0.571 
house_prices 0.000 0.001 0.732 0.002 0.004 0.669 
average_income 0.005 0.006 0.381 0.075 0.046 0.102 
poverty_rate 0.129 0.429 0.764 0.403 0.679 0.553 
       
       
# of obs  230215   337558  
log likelihood  -5430.7   -7448.4  
pseudo R2  0.179   0.141  
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Table 5 
Marginal Effects for Delinquency 
 
  
 
(1)  baseline 
specification 
 (2) interact  
with age 
 (3) update  
credit line 
 
  
marginal s.e. marginal s.e. marginal s.e. 
demandt       
  quarter1 0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  
  quarter2 0.091% 0.006% 0.080% 0.006% 0.096% 0.006% 
  quarter3 0.113% 0.008% 0.100% 0.007% 0.120% 0.008% 
  quarter4 0.111% 0.009% 0.100% 0.008% 0.122% 0.009% 
  quarter5 0.171% 0.013% 0.148% 0.011% 0.187% 0.014% 
  quarter6 0.211% 0.016% 0.179% 0.014% 0.239% 0.018% 
  quarter7 0.214% 0.018% 0.179% 0.015% 0.255% 0.021% 
  quarter8 0.194% 0.018% 0.160% 0.015% 0.238% 0.022% 
       
riskcompt       
  quarter1 0.000%  0.000%  0.000%  
  quarter2 0.000% 0.001% 0.004% 0.001% -0.003% 0.001% 
  quarter3 -0.003% 0.002% 0.005% 0.002% -0.008% 0.002% 
  quarter4 -0.007% 0.002% 0.005% 0.002% -0.014% 0.002% 
  quarter5 -0.027% 0.002% -0.010% 0.003% -0.036% 0.002% 
  quarter6 -0.030% 0.003% -0.011% 0.003% -0.043% 0.003% 
  quarter7 -0.033% 0.003% -0.012% 0.003% -0.048% 0.003% 
  quarter8 -0.035% 0.003% -0.013% 0.003% -0.051% 0.003% 
 
  
 
(4) update risk 
controls 
 (5) state  
dummies 
 
  
marginal s.e. marginal s.e. 
demandt     
  quarter1   0.000%  
  quarter2   0.088% 0.006% 
  quarter3 0.000%   0.104% 0.009% 
  quarter4 -0.004% 0.006% 0.100% 0.010% 
  quarter5 0.020% 0.008% 0.156% 0.016% 
  quarter6 0.030% 0.009% 0.193% 0.019% 
  quarter7 0.029% 0.010% 0.183% 0.025% 
  quarter8 0.017% 0.011% 0.157% 0.027% 
     
riskcompt     
  quarter1   0.000%  
  quarter2   0.000% 0.001% 
  quarter3 0.000%  0.000% 0.003% 
  quarter4 -0.010% 0.001% -0.003% 0.004% 
  quarter5 -0.036% 0.003% -0.023% 0.004% 
  quarter6 -0.010% 0.004% -0.026% 0.004% 
  quarter7 -0.019% 0.005% -0.025% 0.006% 
  quarter8 -0.025% 0.006% -0.025% 0.007% 
Each column reports the marginal effects for the probit models in the corresponding column in Table 4, 
as defined by Eqs. (2) and (3). demandt shows the effect on delinquency rates of varying only the time 
dummies across quarters t, relative to the first quarter. riskcompt shows the effect of varying account age 
and the economic control variables across their cross-sectional averages in different quarters. The units 
are in percentage points per month.  
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Figure 1 
The effects of account age (in months) and time on the probability of delinquency 
Each curve represents the hazard function for a different calendar quarter (from top to bottom, for a 
given age: sample quarters 6, 8, 7, 5, 2, 3, 4, and 1). Each hazard function gives the average probability 
of an account going delinquent at the indicated age (months since booking), conditional on not having 
already defaulted. 
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Figure 2  
The effects of account age (in months) and cohort on the probability of delinquency 
Each curve represents the hazard function for a different cohort of credit card accounts, over the period 
in which that cohort appears in the sample (from left to right: accounts booked in the first half of 1995, 
the second and first halves of 1994 and 1993, 1992, 1991, and 1990). Each hazard function gives the 
average probability of an account going delinquent at the indicated age (months since booking), 
conditional on not having already defaulted. 
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Figure 3 
Marginal effects calculated from the baseline probit model of bankruptcy  
(Table 3, column(1)).  demandt shows the effect on bankruptcy rates of varying only the time dummies 
across quarters t, relative to the first quarter. riskcompt shows the effect of varying account age and the 
economic control variables across their cross-sectional averages in different quarters. See Eqs. (2) and 
(3).  
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Figure 4 
Marginal effects calculated from the baseline probit model of credit card delinquency  
(Table 5, column(1)).  demandt shows the effect on delinquency rates of varying only the time dummies 
across quarters t, relative to the first quarter. riskcompt shows the effect of varying account age and the 
economic control variables across their cross-sectional averages in different quarters. See Eqs. (2) and 
(3).   
 
 
